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I. Introduction
uropean policymakers have viewed the
underdevelopment of the markets for
risk capital with growing concern,
identifying financial obstacles to growth
as a potential weakness of the EU. An explicit
goal of current public policy in Europe is to
promote the development of markets for risk
capital to assist the expansion of existing small
firms, especially in high-technology industries,
and to promote entrepreneurship and the growth
of employment associated with entrepreneurial
firms.  But what happens to a European firm
which goes public remains an open question, as
outside of the UK, few European firms go
public.1
Within Europe, Italy is a particularly very
interesting case.  Publicly traded firms are not
pervasive in the Italian economy.  Few Italian
firms go public.  Until recently, Italy’s public
and private equity markets were among the
smallest in Europe.2 Italian policy has
encouraged better access and more use of equity
capital, and provided firms with incentives to go
public.  It is important to understand how these
policies have influenced the decisions of firm
managers and owners.
Our research examines the behavior of most
of the firms in the Italian economy that went
public over a 23-year time period between 1977
and 1999.  These firms are part of a data set that
contains information for approximately 1700
Italian firms, which we use to provide a
benchmark for comparison.  To set the stage for
our research and as an additional benchmark for
comparison we examine data from the United
States from several thousand newly public US
firms over a similar period.   Our decision to use
                                                
1 One of the few studies to examine European firms’
performance after their IPO is the paper by Pagano, Panetta,
and Zingales (1998, hereinafter PPZ), who examine the
general question of why firms go public. The features of the
Italian data helped to answer the general questions posed by
their research.  In particular, unlike US firms, data for Italian
firms were available for many years prior to the IPO, and
there were a large number of sample firms that did not go
public during the sample period, which gave PPZ with a
“control” group they could exploit in their empirical
analysis.
2 EASD (2000), Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of
European Securities Markets, 27th September.
the US as a benchmark reflects both our priors
and the conventional wisdom that the Initial
Public Offering (IPO) provides young firms
with the financing that they need to rapidly
increase scale and capture profits associated
with good investment opportunities.
While we expected to find differences
between the US and Italy, we were quite
surprised by their extent.  While many firms that
go public in both countries are part of high-
technology industries or industries with a
substantial amount of intangible or specific-use
capital, here the similarities appear to end.  The
size of firms going public in Italy tends to be
much larger than US IPOs.  The amount of
equity capital raised by the typical Italian IPO is
quite small relative to the size of the firm, and
also quite small relative to the typical US IPO.
The average US firm going public grows quite
rapidly (in terms of assets, capital, and sales).  In
contrast, Italian IPOs display much slower
growth after they go public.  Both absolute and
relative employment growth for the typical US
firm that goes public is quite rapid after the IPO.
In contrast, Italian firms that go public tend to
add relatively few employees.  Because one of
the goals of improved access to equity capital is
employment growth, this last point is
particularly relevant for European public policy.
The striking differences between the behavior
of US and Italian firms led us to reorient our
efforts to focus more intensively on the
characteristics of newly public Italian firms.  We
compare the behavior of Italian IPOs prior to
1990 with those after 1990.  There were
important changes in the Italian tax system in
the 1990s that provided incentives for firms to
go public and institutional changes in the Italian
economy as it prepared for full integration into
the EMU.  The 1990s were also witness to
financial innovations in the Italian and European
equity markets that may have increased SMEs
access to equity finance.  Our analysis will help
gauge how better access to public equity
markets has affected firm performance on
several margins.
We also examine how firms of different size
and with different governance structures (e.g.,
group-affiliated or independent) behave after the
IPO.  Firms with different ownership structure
may have different motivations to go public.
E
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For example, firms with high prospects for
growth and no affiliation with pyramidal groups
(and so no access to the group’s internal capital
markets) may be subject to binding financing
constraints. For this class of firms the
motivation to conduct an IPO may be to acquire
finance for rapid growth.
The nature of the firm conducting an IPO,
and the behavior of the firm in its wake, appears
to be changing in Italy.  There were important
differences in the behavior of Italian IPOs
between the 1980s and the 1990s.  Italian firms
that went public in the 1990s are smaller than
Italian firms that went public in the 1980s.  The
size of the IPO was larger relative to the size of
the firm, and the firm retained a larger
proportion of the proceeds of the IPO.
However, firms going public in Italy in the
1990s grew before, not after the IPO.
Importantly, employment growth of Italian IPOs
in the 1990s was larger than those in the 1980s,
a point that may be appreciated by European
policymakers.
We also find important differences in the
behavior of Italian IPOs by ownership structures
and by size. The initial public offering has
practically no impact on the behavior of
affiliated or large firms whereas it positively
affects the growth and performance of
independent and small firms.  Independent and
small firms raise more equity from the IPO and
appear to be using the IPO proceeds for growth.
Our findings also indicate that, after going
public, small firms succeed in obtaining more
funds on the credit market.
Overall, the decision to go public in Italy
appears to be more complex than it is in the US,
where capturing opportunities for growth
appears to dominate other issues.  More
importantly, we believe that for European
policymakers to achieve their desired outcomes,
policies that simply increase access to equity
capital may not be effective unless they also
provide incentives for the firms’ managers to
use the new capital to grow.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. Section II describes the institutional
and regulatory environment facing firms in Italy
and the US that conduct IPOs.  Section III
describes the behavior of firms in the United
States and in Italy samples both prior to and in
the aftermath of their IPOs, illustrating the sharp
differences in their behavior and describing the
changing characteristics of an Italian IPO in the
1990s.  Section IV presents the results of the
regression analysis that investigates the ex-post
and ex-ante behavior of Italian firms that went
public over the period 1977-1999. Section V,
which concludes the paper, describes how our
results might shape these policies.
II. Equity Markets in Italy
II. A The evolution of the Italian stock market
The first Italian stock exchange was created in
Milano in 1808.  Italian exchanges were given
strict and detailed admission criteria for
quotation, which remained largely unchanged
until 1974, when a new law created the
regulatory body which governs the Italian equity
markets, the CONSOB (Commissione Nazionale
per le Società e la Borsa). CONSOB regulations
were tightened in 1984, and became less
restrictive in 1997.
Few firms trade on Italy’s stock market and
the market is small.  In 1980, the number of
companies quoted on Italy’s markets (141) was
smaller than the number at the beginning of the
20th century (approximately 170).  In 1980, the
ratio of market capitalization to GDP in Italy
was only 3.1 percent.  During the 1980s the
number of listed firms increased following the
stock market boom and the economic expansion,
but the value of market capitalization remained
low (7.4% of GDP in 1987) and the number of
new listings dropped towards the end of the
decade.  The development of the Italian
exchanges has been slow because of the
important role of the banking sector in the
provision of funds to the corporate sector and
state ownership in Italian industry.
In the 1990s, the Italian stock market showed
signs of more vigorous development.  From
1990 to 1999, 120 companies listed, most of
them between 1995 and 1999 and the
capitalization of the market as a percentage of
GDP ratio rose from 6.6 to 73% in June 2000 (in
the US the ratio was 114.5%).3  This upsurge
                                                
3 Notably, however, in this period, 123 companies were retired
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may be related to new financial developments
spurred by the European Commission’s
requirements to join the Single Market (1993)
and later the European Monetary Union (1999).4
European integration policies required
liberalized capital markets and widespread
privatizations.  Large privatizations in the Italian
economy were one factor for the large jump in
market capitalization.  The Stock Exchange
itself was privatized in late 1997 and new, less
restrictive criteria to be admitted for quotation
were issued5. A tax incentive was offered to
small and medium companies that decided to go
public in 19946.   The Italian government also
introduced a tax reform program in 1997 meant
to reduce the tax burden for shareholders and a
new dividend tax credit regime was introduced.
Finally the Nuovo Mercato, the Italian
counterpart of the NASDAQ, opened in 1999.
II. B Barriers to going public in Italy
It is well known that the costs of going public
are large.  For a small to medium sized Italian
firms, the Stock Exchange Council’s 1994
estimate of the direct cost of going public was
slightly more than 4% of the gross proceeds of
the IPO. In the US, Chen and Ritter (2000) show
that in the period from 1995 to 1998, more than
90 percent of issuers paid underwriting fees of
7% of the proceeds. They remark that spreads
on IPOs in the US are much higher than in other
countries.
An important component of the costs of going
public is the underpricing of the IPO.  There are
many potential explanations for why shares in
                                                                     
from quotation, mostly because they were taken private, not
because they went bankrupt. Therefore, at the end of 1999,
only 264 firms were enlisted at the Italian Stock Exchange
(in contrast 2619 US firms were listed at NYSE, at the end of
1999).
4 Amongst the legal and institutional reforms that reshaped the
financial markets in Italy in the early 1990s, was the new
discipline for securities markets, financial intermediaries,
and brokerage firms, the introduction of the trading-on-line
system (the Italian “big-bang”), the regulation of take-over
bids, the widening of the operational span for investment
funds, common funds, as well as a growing attention toward
disclosure rules and transparency.
5 For a detailed discussion of listing requirements and costs in
Italy, an appendix is available from the authors.
6 In 1995 and 1996, sixteen companies went public exploiting
this tax incentive, according to the CONSOB annual report.
an IPO are underpriced.7  One explanation that
is likely to be relevant for Italian companies is
the adverse selection problem that arises from
information asymmetries in the financial market.
Cherubini and Ratti (1991) show an
underpricing premium of 27.1 percent over the
period 1985 to 1991. CONSOB estimates of the
average underpricing for Italian firms over the
period 1988-94 show a premium of 26.6
percent.  The premium for Italian firms is large
when compared to US firms, and even larger
when compared to other large European
countries. Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994)
report underpricing premia of 15.8% in the US,
of 4.2% in France, and of 10.9% in Germany.
Jenkinson (1990) reports underpricing of 12.2%
for UK firms.  There has, however, been a sharp
decline in the underpricing of recent Italian
IPOs, which may reflect the development and
increased liquidity of the Italian equity markets.
CONSOB estimated the underpricing premium
during the period 1995-2000 at 7.2 percent.
The institutional environment facing an
Italian firm, although broadly representative of
the environment that faces the typical European
firm, is quite different from that in the US.
Venture capital flows in much of Europe, but
especially Italy, tend to be quite small.  US
underwriters are highly experienced, and
institutional investors (pension funds, insurance
companies, and investment funds) provide a
great deal of capital for investment, even at very
early stages and are increasingly active in
corporate governance.  In contrast, some
European countries still restrict the ability of
institutional investors to participate in equity
markets.  Compared to Europe, the market for
corporate control in the US is very active and
there are many laws and regulations designed to
protect the interests of minority shareholders.
Up to the end of 1997 the regulatory
requirements to be approved for listing on the
Milano Stock Exchange were similar to those in
force at the NYSE, and much more severe than
those required by the NASDAQ. Italian firms
needed to display shareholders’ equity in excess
                                                
7 The extent of and the motivations for the underpricing
phenomenon have received much attention (see Ritter and
Welch, 2002, for a recent survey).  See also Ritter (1987),
Jenkinson (1990), and Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (1999) for
international comparisons of its size.
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. n.  10/2004
8
of 10 billion lira, positive earnings in the three
years prior to listing and at least 25% of the
equity must be floated among at least 500 new
shareholders. The requirement of three years of
positive earnings means that small, young,
Italian firms face very large barriers to equity
capital relative to similar firms in the US. Until
1999, when the New Market was introduced,
start up firms with R&D intensive projects in the
development stage could not have listed at all
under the Italian rules.
Finally, firms that go public face extensive
disclosure requirements, which may force them
to disclose sensitive information to potential
competitors.  Disclosure rules also expose
companies to a closer scrutiny from tax
authorities, thus reducing the scope for tax
elusion.  Issues regarding disclosure are not
emphasized in the US literature.  Indeed, a large
number of US companies that go public are in
the high tech sector, and they must disclose
some information about their ongoing projects
in their prospectus.
In addition to costs and requirements to list, a
variety of additional barriers exist in Italy that
limit both the demand for equity shares and the
supply of equity finance.  Together, these
factors can help to explain the small number of
listed firms and the relatively small
capitalization of the equity market.
The demand for equity shares in Italy was
limited by a lack of participation of institutional
investors, government policies that discouraged
the holding of equity by individuals and limited
the liquidity of shares, and a legal system that
poorly protected the interests of minority
shareholders. Investment (mutual) funds are a
recent development in Italy and their role is not
nearly as important in Italy as it is in the US.8
The private pension system is virtually
nonexistent in Italy.  Italian pension funds also
face significant regulatory barriers to holding
                                                
8 Mutual funds were introduced in Italy in 1983. They did not
hold an economically meaningful share of equity until the
end of the 1980s. In the 1990s, institutional investment as a
proportion of households’ total financial investment in Italy
has been steadily increasing (from 9.8% in 1990, to 16.7% in
1995 and 33% in 1999), but is still much lower than in the
US. At the end of the 1990s, the proportion of households'
total financial assets held by institutional investors in Italy
and US was 37.0% and 70.5%, respectively (Bank of Italy,
Annual Reports, 2000 and 2001).
equity, although these regulations are currently
being debated by the legislature and may soon
be eliminated.
Several broad elements of the economy in
Italy discouraged household savings and
individual investors from using the equity
market.  Because of a need to finance a large
public deficit, the Italian government gave tax
preferences to increase demand for treasury
obligations. Until the early 1990s the capital
markets were tightly regulated, and individual
investors faced thin domestic markets for equity
shares. At the same time regulations made it
impossible to diversify individual portfolios by
holding shares of foreign firms.
Lastly, some observers have pointed to a
high-degree of risk aversion, with respect to the
decision to hold equity, on the part of the Italian
public.  This is partly due to the poor protection
of minority shareholders’ interests. La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV,
1998) place Italy amongst the countries that
share the French civil law tradition, which
provides weak legal protection to investors and
minority shareholders, a lower quality of law
enforcement and the poorest accounting
standards.9 In contrast, the common law legal
framework in Anglo-Saxon countries provides
stronger protection to minority shareholders’
interests and may be better able to support an
equity market (LLSV, 1998; Modigliani and
Perotti, 2000).
The supply of equity in Italy is limited
because of the structure of corporate
governance. Corporate governance in Italy, like
much of continental Europe, is centered upon
family ownership.  Some research suggests that
the owner-founder of the company may be
reluctant to go public because he fears that he
will eventually be compelled to release the
firm’s control and the private benefits associated
with it (Barca, 1994).10  Other research suggests
                                                
9 The inferior level of protection of Italian minority investors,
in international comparisons, is acknowledged by the
CONSOB itself (Annual Report, 2000), with the provision,
however, that the recently introduced reforms “pave the way
to strengthen the protection of shareholders”. Johnson, La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) document that
legal tunneling (a term originally coined to define the
expropriation of minority shareholders in the Czech
Republic) has occurred in developed civil-law countries such
as Italy, France and Belgium.
10 Zingales (1994) documents what appear to be enormous
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. n.  10/2004
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that raising funds in public equity markets may
be less attractive because valuation of corporate
assets is lower in countries with poor investor
protection, like Italy (LLSV, 2002; Burkart,
Panunzi, Shleifer, 2003). Ownership
concentration is typically high, and even the
largest corporations are controlled by a single
individual or a family, often through pyramidal
business groups (Bianchi, Bianco, and Enriques,
2001). Several explanations have been proposed
for the existence of groups (Brioschi, Buzzacchi,
Colombo, 1989; Bebchuck, Kraakman, Triantis,
2000). Affiliation with pyramidal groups can
reduce the severity of financing constraints for
member firms (Schiantarelli and Sembenelli,
2000; Carpenter and Rondi, 2000). Groups’
controlling shareholders may conduct carve outs
in order to raise funds for the internal capital
market and to maximize the proceeds from
selling shares in a subsidiary (see also PPZ)
without losing their control rights over the
whole group structure. Finally, the group
structure helps the controlling shareholder to
control a large amount of assets with a minimal
investment. Under poor investor protection, this
exacerbates the agency problems between inside
and outside shareholders.
III. Going public to grow?  An Initial Look
A common perspective is that a firm conducting
an IPO represents the successful culmination of
the entrepreneurial process.  Because equity
finance is expensive, firms that conduct an IPO
should have investment opportunities that, ex
ante, appear highly profitable.  The IPO
provides young firms with needed funds to
increase scale and capture profits.  For the US,
empirical evidence exists to support some of
these arguments.  Firms going public in the US
tend to be young and small.  Ritter (1991)
examines a sample of 1526 US IPOs during the
period 1975-1984 and finds that the typical
issuing firm is 6 years old.  The median firm in
his sample has sales of $7.59 million.  Carpenter
                                                                     
private benefits of control rights.  He shows that the
premium attributed to voting shares (as compared to
nonvoting shares) on the Milan Stock Exchange from 1987-
1990 is as large as 82 percent of the value of the share. See
also, for more recent evidence, Dyck and Zingales (2004).
and Petersen (2002) examine a large panel of
US high-tech companies and find that firms
grow rapidly after going public.  They report
that the median firm’s assets triple five years
after the IPO, and employment grows by 70
percent relative to the year of the IPO.11
III. A The data
The remainder of the paper explores the
consequences of the going public decision for
the growth of Italian firms.
To conduct our study, we use a large dataset
of Italian manufacturing firms constructed by
CERIS-CNR using data published by
Mediobanca, a large investment bank (annual
directory Le principali società).  The database is
an unbalanced panel of 1715 companies over the
period 1977-1999.  It includes only firms with at
least five consecutive observations so that each
firm has a time series of at least five and at most
twenty-one years. The data contain information
about the firms’ income statement and balance
sheet variables. It also provides information
about the firms’ age, ultimate ownership, group-
affiliation and business activity.12  Only a
minority of the sample firms is publicly traded.
Of the 137 listed manufacturing firms in the
panel, 57 companies went public on the MSE
during the sample period, the latest entry being
in 1997 to have at least three observations after
the IPO.13 For the 57 firms conducting an IPO,
                                                
11 It is important to note, however, that the ex post performance
of the share price of US IPOs typically under perform a
sample of matching firms in the long run (Ritter, 1991).
12 For a comprehensive description of the database, see
Benfratello et al. (2001).
13 To identify quoted companies we used the annual directory
Indici e Dati published by Mediobanca, and “Il Taccuino
dell’Azionista”.  We used Table X of Indici e Dati (1998) to
find the date when a firm was listed (began trading publicly)
on the Milano Stock Exchange (MSE). To identify the date
when the proceeds from going public accrued to the firm we
used Table XIV of Indici e Dati (1998) which reports the
period and the terms of the public offering. We found that for
several firms the year they first became listed did not match
with the year of the IPO. In some cases this occurred because
the firm was previously listed in one of the minor Italian
exchanges or the Mercato Ristretto.  In some cases the firm
received the proceeds from its IPO in the year prior to its
listing on an exchange.  Our results are based on the exact
year when the firm received funds from the sale of common
stock through its IPO.  PPZ noted a similar problem when
they constructed the sample for their study.  They noted that
their results were robust to the choice of dates for the IPO.
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. n.  10/2004
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we examine their size, growth, leverage, and
profitability around the period of the IPO. We
also examine how much equity finance accrued
to the firm at the time of its IPO and how firms
used the proceeds of their IPO.  And while it is
true that only a small percentage of the total
number of sample firms go public, our sample
contains a large proportion (about two thirds) of
the total number of non-financial companies that
go public in Italy during the sample period.
Because the US is often used as a benchmark
for the comparison of risk capital markets we
made limited use of an unbalanced panel of
3189 US publicly traded manufacturing firms
from COMPUSTAT over the period 1981-1997,
for comparative purposes.  We include both
active and inactive companies.  All sample firms
must be incorporated in the U.S.
III. B Comparing Italian and US firms
A comparison between the two samples of IPOs
shows that Italian firms are much larger than US
firms in terms of employment (579 vs. 130 at
the median), real sales (71.4 vs. 25 bn. Lira),
and real total assets (73.4 vs. 16.1 bn. Lira).
Moreover, Italian firms going public tend to be
quite old (the median age is 23).14
Table 1 highlights the differences between
newly public US and Italian firms that was the
genesis of our study.  Panel A shows median
growth rates for US firms from t-1, the year
prior to the IPO, to t+3.  Panel B shows median
growth rates for Italian firms.  US firms grow
very rapidly the year they go public (t+0).  The
rapid growth is readily apparent in all four
measures contained in Table 1.  Total assets
(line 1) grows by 67 percent the year the firm
goes public.  The rapid growth of this
component is to be expected, as cash proceeds
from the IPO are a component of total assets.
The firms’ stock of fixed capital grows rapidly
in the year of the IPO, increasing by almost 33
percent.  The rapid growth of capital persists
until after t+2 suggesting that firms use the
                                                
14 Our evidence is consistent with other research that also
shows that firms going public in Italy, and other EU member
states as well, tend to be old and large. PPZ report, for the
IPOs in their study, an average of 33 and a median of 26.
Rydqvist and Hogholm (1995) report an average age of 40
for new public firms in Europe.
proceeds of the IPO to dramatically increase the
scale of the firm.  Labour inputs also increase
rapidly at and after the IPO.  Employment grows
by 18.5 percent in t+0, and employment growth
appears persistent.15  Sales growth rates for US
firms going public are also high.16
Panel B of Table 1 shows the median growth
rates of newly public Italian firms.  Assets,
capital, and sales all show positive growth rates
both prior to the IPO, the year of the IPO itself,
and in the three years succeeding it.  However, it
is important to note that they are quantitatively
very small compared to those of firms in the
United States.  Newly public Italian firms also
display growth rates that are unspectacular in an
absolute sense.  Somewhat ominously from the
standpoint of public policy, the Italy’s new
public firms display very little, if any, growth in
employment.
Because Italian firms are much larger than
US firms when they go public, a possible
explanation of the growth differences between
the two samples may be the difference in the
initial firm size. We therefore calculated the
growth rates for a sub-sample of size
comparable US firms, - i.e. with a median
number of 500 employees at the date of the IPO.
We found that US large firms’ growth rates of
total assets, sales, employment, and particularly,
fixed capital are still much higher than Italian
firms’, in most cases twice as large (see Table
A2 in the Appendix).
These large differences in behavior between
Italian and US firms that go public suggest that
they may very well go public for different
reasons.
                                                
15 Although not shown in the table, we found that median
employment increased from 130 employees in the year of the
IPO to 215 3 years after.  This result helps to illustrate why
European policymakers have displayed such interest in
reducing potential obstacles to going public.
16 The growth of newly public US firms proceeds at such high
rates that it is quite unlikely that they are driven by industry
level or macroeconomic growth.  Nonetheless, to partially
control for this possibility, we “matched” firms by
calculating the median growth rates, by year, for all variables
in Table 1 using firms in the same three-digit industry.  We
standardized the growth rate by subtracting the newly public
firm’s growth rate for each year t-1 to t+3 from the industry
median for the corresponding calendar year.  The results
appear in the appendix the paper, in table A1.  They show
that even when we match new public firms to this control
group, the extraordinarily high growth rates during the
period surrounding the IPO remain.
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III. C Characteristics of the Italian IPO Sample
Figure one shows how the Italian IPOs were
distributed through time.  The distribution of
IPOs in the sample is distinctly bimodal, with
activity clustering in two periods; the mid 1980s
and the late 1990s.  There are demand and
supply-side explanations for clusters of IPOs.
Demand side explanations are based upon the
idea that firms require equity capital for growth.
Supply side explanations are based upon the
idea that the equity markets help to absorb a
large supply of funds which need to be invested.
Overlaid on the table are graphs showing the
time series properties of Italian GDP growth and
equity prices.  The data in figure 1 do not help
identify which of the explanations are more
likely.  On the one hand, robust economic
growth in mid 1980s might help drive an
increase in the demand for equity capital and
help explain the cluster of IPOs.  Likewise,
Italian managers’ anticipation that their markets
would grow after Italy was admitted into the
EMU might also be consistent with demand side
explanations and the cluster of IPOs in the
1990s.  On the other hand, the growth in equity
prices in both the 1980s and 1990s might be
consistent with a hot issue market and a supply
side explanation for the clusters of IPOs in both
periods.
Table 2 provides a set of summary statistics
for new public firms in the year of their IPO
grouped by ownership structure, size and year of
the IPO.  The first column displays statistics for
the full sample of IPOs. To place them into
perspective, in column two we provide a second
set of statistics for all firms that did not go
public and were not quoted on the stock
exchange during the sample period.  Section I of
the table shows some physical characteristics of
the firm.  Firms that went public were
substantially larger than nonpublic firms, with
approximately 60 percent larger sales, over
twice as many total assets, and more than 200
more employees, at the median. Firms
conducting IPOs were younger than nonpublic
firms. Section II of the table provides
information about the financial characteristics of
the firm.
Figure 1 – Italian Firms Going Public in the 1980-1999 Period, GDP growth, Real Interest Rate,
and Share Price Index
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Firms conducting IPOs appear to be less
indebted than the nonpublic firm sample.  At the
median, the ratio of total debt to total assets is
0.162 for the IPO sample vs. 0.252 for the
nonpublic firm sample.  Section III of the table
shows some of the operating characteristics of
the firm. In the year of the IPO, listed firms
display substantially higher returns on assets
(0.171 vs. 0.114) and returns on equity (0.585
vs. 0.474).17  Also, they tend to invest at a
higher rate relative to the size of their capital
stock (0.159 vs. 0.104 for the nonpublic
sample). On balance, the higher returns on
assets and equity, combined with the faster rate
of investment, suggest that the newly public
firms perform somewhat better than the
nonpublic firms do.  The IPO sample’s lower
indebtedness also suggests somewhat superior
financial performance.
The last section of the table shows the
characteristics of proceeds of the IPO itself.
The gross proceeds of the IPO, scaled by the
firms beginning of period total assets is 0.304.
Scaled by end of period total assets, the ratio is
0.243.  Roughly put, if all the proceeds of the
IPO were ploughed back into the firm, it would
increase its scale by roughly 30 percent. The
statistic for our sample of US firms, which
includes the entire manufacturing sector, is
0.994.18  One reason for the distinct difference
between the growth of Italian and US IPOs in
table 1 now becomes quite clear: the size of the
IPO an Italian firm conducts is roughly 30
percent of the size of a US IPO, relative to the
size of the firm.  Furthermore, much of the
proceeds of the IPO is not retained by an Italian
firm.  Net proceeds, which are gross proceeds
less proceeds retained by the existing
shareholder, have a median value less than half
that of gross proceeds, suggesting that the owner
manager uses the IPO to extract his wealth from
the firm.19 A more precise measure of the
                                                
17 For enlisting firms, we computed ROA and ROE by using
beginning of period equity and assets to account for the
influence of the IPO. However, this results in the loss of a
few observations, as some firms enter the panel in the year
that they go public.
18 Carpenter and Petersen (2002) calculated a similar statistic
for a sample of newly public US high technology firms.
They found the ratio of new equity funds to total assets in the
year of the IPO had a median value of 1.76.
19 We used the information in Indici e Dati to distinguish
proceeds of the IPO retained by the firm would
match gross and net proceeds for a given firm.
We therefore calculated net proceeds/gross
proceeds, and found that its median value is
0.531.
In Table 2, columns three and four compare
characteristics of group affiliated and
independent companies, observed at the median
as of the year of quotation.20 For each variable,
we performed two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum
tests of the difference of medians. Independent
firms going public are slightly older and
significantly smaller than carve-outs.
Independent IPOs also display a higher debt to
asset ratio, but a lower proportion of long term
debt.  Independent IPOs appear slightly less
profitable than group affiliated IPOs, but also
display significantly higher investment rate.
The characteristics of the IPO is where we find
the most striking differences between the two
sub-samples. Not only independent firms raise
more funds than carve-outs relative to the size of
the firm (0.263 vs. 0.147), they also plough
them back into the firm at a much higher degree
(0.682). At the median, carve-outs retain none of
the proceeds into the firm. These findings
support the mainstream hypotheses about the
motivations to go public for group-affiliated and
independent firms. Within a pyramidal business
group, the so-called Chinese-box mechanism
allows the controlling shareholder to sell part of
his shares and diversify his wealth while still
retaining the control rights.  In contrast, raising
equity funds for growth appears as the dominant
issue for independent firms where large amounts
of retained proceeds combine with higher
investment rates.
Columns five and six report separate statistics
                                                                     
between shares offered for sale by old shareholders and new
shares offered for sale.  The firm would receive the proceeds
only of the latter kind of sale.  We defined total proceeds as
the sum of the sale of shares from existing shareholders and
the sale of new shares.  We defined net proceeds (proceeds
that accrue to the firm) as the sale of new shares.
20 As explained in Section II, many listed firms in Italy belong
to large pyramidal groups, or are technically carve-outs (i.e.,
firms belonging to a group where at least one company is
quoted).  Of the 137 quoted firms in the CERIS panel, 61 are
affiliated to a large pyramidal group.  Of the 57 newly public
firms, 23 are group-affiliated. Interestingly, floatation of
subsidiaries or carve-outs is more typical of the Eighties (21
out of 38 new listings are group affiliates), than of the
Nineties, when none of the firms taken public belongs to a
major group.
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for IPO by firm size. We define “small” a firm
with real sales less than 40 bn. Lira at the IPO
date.  Small firms appear older, at the median,
than large firms do, when they go public. While
it is true that many large new listings are de
facto carve-outs from a mature business group,
this finding is consistent with well-documented
evidence that in Italy, firms tend to remain small
for long.
The main difference between small and large
firms is the characteristics of the IPO. Small
firms raise a significant larger share of net
proceeds than large firms, relative to the firm
size, and they retain virtually all of the proceeds
within the firm. At the median, the ration
between net and gross proceeds is 0.996 for
small firms and 0.261 for large firms.  Whether
small firms use the new equity funds to
rebalance their books or to finance growth is a
matter that we can better handle with the
econometric analysis.
The last two columns of Table 2 split the data
into the periods 1977-1989 and the period 1990-
1999.  Firms that went public in the 1990’s were
much smaller, in terms of employment, sales
and assets. They also appear less indebted, and
while they had similar or slightly poorer returns
on assets and equity, they displayed faster rates
of investment.  When we turn to the initial
public offerings, we find that IPOs in the 1990s
were significantly bigger relative to the firm
size, and that the firm retained a significantly
larger share of the proceeds.  Total proceeds
doubled at the median, from 17 percent of assets
to 35 percent of assets.  Net proceeds in the
1980s were only 0.4 percent of assets, yielding
the firm essentially no funds that it could use for
growth, and nearly 20 percent of assets in the
1990s. Since the new listings were also typically
independent, small-sized firms, this final piece
of evidence suggests that institutional changes in
the 1990s encouraged a new type of firms to tap
the equity markets.
III. D Differences between pre- and post-IPO
behaviour
In Table 3 we compare size, growth,
profitability and leverage of enlisting firms
before and after the IPO. The table reports the
median values of two-year averages for the
firms for which observations are available and
significance tests of difference between
medians.
Looking at the entire IPO sample, we find
that number of employees is larger (638 vs.
592), and that labour inputs appear to be
growing somewhat faster after the IPO.
However firms do not appear to grow any faster
after the IPO in terms of fixed capital
investment and real sales. Both profitability and
leverage are significantly lower after going
public.  When we split the data by governance
structure, we find that independent IPOs
significantly increase the firm size (measured by
employees) while they decrease both
profitability and leverage. In contrast, group
affiliated firms do not display statistically
significant differences in their behaviour around
the IPO date.  When we compare IPOs over time
we find that new listings in the 1990s report
higher investment rates and sales growth before
going public and faster employment growth
after the IPO, while leverage significantly
declines after going public.21
Overall, Table 3 highlights the similarity of
independent and recent IPOs, with similarly
higher growth rates of sales and fixed capital
before the IPO, and faster employment growth
after the IPO.  This appears as a major
recurrence in the face of the uneventful story of
firms that either belong to pyramidal groups or
went public in the 1980s.
IV. Econometric Results
In this section, we carry out an econometric
analysis of the ex-post and the ex-ante
behaviour of Italian firms that went public over
the period 1977-1999.  We examine the
behaviour of Italian IPOs grouped by size,
ownership structures, and timing of the IPO.
The model is a simple empirical specification
that tests the effects of the decision to go public
on a set of variables that account for the firm’s
operating performance, financial characteristics
and growth (see for example, PPZ, 1998).
We regress each variable on a set of dummy
                                                
21 We do not report statistics for the large and small firms’ sub-
samples because the data requirement to construct the two-
year averages leaves us with only nine small firms.
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variables for the year of the IPO and the three
subsequent years.  Since only firms that meet
the listing requirements can go public, their
performance can be different from that of the
other firms in the panel.  We therefore include
an additional set of dummies, which at time t, t-
1, t-2 and t-3 take value 1 if firm i meets the
requirements for listing on the Italian exchange
(positive earnings and equity greater than 10bn
lira).  We include time dummies to control for
the business cycle and for other macroeconomic
conditions, for example the evolution of the
stock price index and interest rates.  Our model
takes the form:
itt
j
ijtj
j
jtjit fQUOIPOy ελδβα +++++= ∑∑
=
−
=
−
3
0
3
0
[1]
where i indexes firms and t time, and fi  and λt
are firm and time dummies, respectively. Yit is,
in turn, a financial or operating variable, or a
growth rate. IPOt is a dummy variable that
returns a value of one when the firm goes public
(in the subsequent years, e.g., one year after the
public offering, IPOt-1 = 1, and IPOt = IPOt-2 =
IPOt-3 = 0).  Lags of IPO then control for
persistence in the effects of going public and
help describe the ex post behaviour of the firm.
Likewise, QUOt is the dummy variable
controlling for differences in the performance
between firms that meet the listing requirements
and those that do not. Finally, in order to
account for cross-sample differences, the IPO
dummies are interacted with two dummies
indicating the firm’s status (i.e. date of the IPO,
ownership, and size).
Table 4 reports estimated coefficients from
panel regressions where standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity.22 For each variable
we show estimates for the three sets of sub-
samples separately.23
                                                
22 When we split the sample of IPO firms across time, the
number of post-IPO observations for firms going public in
the 1990s becomes very small, which may reduce the
precision of the estimates, especially for t+3.
23 We omit reporting the coefficients on the control
variables/dummies (QUOt etc.) and of the time dummies for
brevity.  Although not reported in the Tables, the estimated
coefficients for the set of QUO dummy variables are always
statistically significant.
To investigate the behaviour of the firms
before they go public, Table 5 reports results
from a similar model where the operating or
financial variable is regressed against a set of
dummies that takes value 1 for the year
preceding the IPO.  The specification takes the
form:
itt
j
ijtj
j
jtjit fQUOIPOy ελδβα +++++= ∑∑
=
+
=
+
3
0
3
0
[2]
IV. A IPO-80s vs. IPO-90s
The first set of results in Table 4 refers to IPOs
grouped by timing of the initial public offering.
The ex-post behaviour of firms going public in
the 1990s, i.e. in a period of favourable
institutional change, appears disappointingly
similar to the behaviour of their predecessors. In
the 1990s Italian firms did not grow faster after
going public in term of investment, total assets
and employment. If any, they even grew less
than firms going public in the 1980s in term of
real sales.  After going public, profitability
significantly decreases for IPO90s whereas it
increases for IPO80s. Leverage also decreases
for IPO90s, and the decline is persistent and
quantitatively large. The statistical evidence is
also pronounced when the long-term debt to
assets ratio is used. For all variables, the
difference between estimated coefficients across
the two sub-samples is statistically significant in
most years.
When we turn to ex-ante behaviour, we find
that IPO80s do not exhibit any discernible
growth pattern whereas IPO90s have grown
significantly before they went public.  Table 5
reports significantly positive coefficients on pre-
IPO dummies at t-1 and t-2 in the regressions
for fixed investment, total assets, sales and
employment. Firms in the 1990s also display
higher profitability before going public. In
contrast, firms going public in the 1980s before
going public.
The ex-ante pattern of IPO90s’ results may
either indicate spending for a growth project in
anticipation of going public, or reflect the
manager’s decision to go public to take
advantage of a window of opportunity.  The
evidence from post-IPO regressions is rather
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clear, however, - the growth process stopped
right after the IPO, profitability began to
decrease in t+1, while leverage persistently
declined throughout the period. This suggests
that managers in the 1990s took their companies
public at the peak of a successful period of
growth, when floatation would allow them to
maximize the IPO proceeds, and then used the
equity funds to rebalance the companies’ books.
IV. B  Independent vs. Affiliated IPOs
In Table 5 we find that, similarly to IPO90s,
independent firms tend to grow faster
immediately before the IPO. At t-1, they display
positive and significant coefficients indicating
faster growth of fixed and total assets, real sales
and employment. Table 4, however, shows that,
differently from IPO90s, independent firms
continue to grow after going public, the
evidence more pronounced when we examine
growth of total assets (at t and t+2) and
employment (at t+1 and t+3).  Because they
also appear to be reducing leverage quite
substantially for two years after the IPO, their
behaviour may reflect spending in anticipation of
going public and subsequent use of IPO proceeds
to increase the scale of the firm and rebalance
the company’s books.
Independent firms also tend to grow
significantly faster than group-affiliated firms
both before and after the IPO.  Indeed, very few
of the estimated coefficients for carve-outs are
statistically significant, indicating that the going
public decision is not a turning point in the
affiliated firms’ life cycle.  This evidence
confirms that other issues appear to dominate
the motivation to list a subsidiary, such as to
allow the group’s controlling shareholder to
divest partly from the company, or to separate
control rights from cash flow rights, or to
maximize the IPO proceeds when the issue
market is hot.
IV. C Small firms vs. Large firms
Our analysis reveals that small firms’ growth is
the most affected by the going public decision.
The descriptive analysis in Section III
highlighted that small firms were found to retain
almost all of the proceeds from the IPO.
Regression results in Table 4 show what they
used them for.  The investment equation shows
that small firms have grown significantly more
than large firms do in term of fixed assets at t,
t+2, and t+3. This result holds when the small
firms’ sub-sample is limited to that going public
in the 1990s and the growth rate of small firms
appears to be quantitatively larger (not reported
in the table).  More importantly from the
perspective of public policy, employment also
tend to be growing faster.  Small firms also
increase profitability after the IPO, particularly
if measured by Return on Sales, suggesting that
highly profitable growth opportunities led small
firms to tap the equity markets.  In this respect,
the ex-post behaviour of small firms is more
similar to that of newly public US firms than
any other of the other sub-samples we
examined.
Lastly, the pattern of small firms’
indebtedness after the IPO suggests that access
to the equity market may facilitate borrowing in
the credit market.  We find that small firm
increase their leverage significantly more than
large firms two and three years after the IPO.
The evidence is more pronounced if we use the
ratio of Long Term Debt to Assets, with positive
and highly significant coefficients at t+2 and
t+3. This may indicate that newly public small
firms succeed in obtaining further external funds as
their public visibility increases and information-
related problems decrease in the years subsequent
the IPO (Roell, 1996, and Anderson, 1994).
V. Conclusions
This paper sets the stage for its analysis by
comparing the behavior of firms that go public
in Italy and in the US.  We find that firms that
go public in Italy and the US behave in
startlingly different ways.  US firms tend to
grow rapidly, in terms of assets, capital, and
employment.  The proceeds raised as a result of
the IPO are large relative to the size of the firm.
In contrast, Italian firms do not grow rapidly
after their IPOs and the IPO itself does not
appear to generate a substantial amount of
financial capital for the firm.  Firms going
public in Italy are typically older and larger than
firms going public in the US.  The managers of
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a US firm going public appear to do so primarily
to obtain funds to rapidly increase the scale of
the firm.  In contrast, the owner/managers of
Italian firms appear less motivate by growth
projects.
The challenge for research, and policy, is to
determine why the typical Italian firm that goes
public behaves much differently from its US
counterpart.  We exploit features of the Italian
institutional context and of the corporate and
governance structures to derive further insights
from cross-sectional differences in the effects of
the decision to list.  We also exploit features of
our data to investigate enlisting firms’ growth,
profitability and leverage before they go public.
Our statistical and econometric analysis
highlights the existence of a dual class of IPOs
in Italy with different motivations to go public.
We label them “Old-style” and “New-style”
firms.
“Old-style” firms have controlling
shareholders that use the IPO as a way to
diversify their wealth, to maximize the IPO
proceeds in a “window of opportunity”, to
separate ownership and control along a chain of
subsidiaries. Their motivation to go public has
nothing to do with growth. Large firms,
particularly those affiliated to pyramidal
business groups feature in this class. “Old style”
firms are more likely to go public within poorly
developed financial markets, and flourish under
legal systems providing weak protections to
minority investors.
“New-style” firms use the equity capital to
finance either an undergoing or a prospective
growth project, and then use the IPO proceeds to
de-leverage, re-balancing the capital structure
after investment and growth.  Small firms and
independent companies feature in this class.
With undeveloped capital markets, the costs of
going public can be prohibitively large for these
firms, but the absence of a pyramidal structure
may signal lower risks of expropriation to
minority shareholders, thus increasing the
demand for equity from investors.
Our findings suggest that institutional and
regulatory changes as well as tax reforms in the
1990s encouraged more “New-style” firms, to
go public. We noticed that the IPO
characteristics of Italian firms going public in
the 1990s did change, with larger amounts of
equity finance raised, and a larger proportion of
proceeds reinvested in the firm. We also found
that “New-style” firms appear to be pursuing a
growth strategy, either just before going public,
as independent firms do, or after the IPO, as
small firms do.  In spite of this evidence, the
differences between Italian and US newly public
firms’ growth rates remain so large in an
absolute sense, that they raise further questions
about the effectiveness of European policies to
generate employment through easier access to
equity finance.
We have found that recent policy reforms
have facilitated the access to public equity
markets for a new type of firms that would have
not gone public under the old regime.  However,
our research also suggests that going public does
not guarantee either faster growth or more jobs.
Public policies must provide shareholders with
incentives to use new capital to grow.  The
cross-sectional differences we found between
independent and affiliated firms clearly argue in
favour of any reform aimed at dismantling
pyramidal business groups.  The discipline of
existing instruments of separation of ownership
and control is a matter that requires to create
countervailing monitoring devices for minority
shareholders, to tighten corporate governance
rules and to strengthen investors’ legal
protections.
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Table 1A – US Firms going Public 1981-1997
(Medians)
t-1 t+0 t+1 t+2 t+3
1. Growth rate of Total Assets 0.258 0.670 0.082 0.066 0.042
2. Growth rate of Fixed Capital 0.154 0.323 0.239 0.098 0.039
3. Growth rate of Sales 0.214 0.247 0.195 0.146 0.114
4. Growth rate of Employment 0.094 0.185 0.149 0.092 0.056
Table 1B – Italian Firms going Public 1977-1997
(Medians)
t-1 t+0 t+1 t+2 t+3
1. Growth rate of Total Assets 0.086 0.141 0.081 0.074 0.049
2. Growth rate of Fixed Capital 0.024 0.071 0.046 0.020 0.024
3. Growth rate of Sales 0.058 0.022 0.052 0.067 0.046
4. Growth rate of Employment 0.009 -0.001 0.025 -0.027 -0.004
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Table 2
Characteristics of the IPO Sample, Grouped by Ownership, Size, and the Year of the IPO
(median values)
IPO Sample (1) Full Sample (2) Group AffiliatedIPOs
Independent
IPOs
Large Firm
IPOs
Small Firm
IPOs
IPO 80
(1977-1989)
IPO 90
(1991-1999)
N. Firms 57 14,265 obs. 24 33 42 15 38 19
I. Firm Characteristics
Employees 579 373 912 404 a 755 283 a 717 353 b
Real Sales (Mill. ITL, 1980=100) 71,428 44,358 87,322 53,304 b 91,081 32,019 a 76,568 58,253
Real Total Assets (Mill. ITL, 1980=100) 73,412 38,836 96,087 62,305 a 82,281 31,675 a 75,537 67,409
Age 23.0 28 22.5 24 21.5 25 20.5 25
II. Financial Characteristics
Leverage 0.310 0.503 0.349 0.310 0.280 0.411 0.393 0.225
Debt / Assets 0.162 0.252 0.134 0.213 0.141 0.256 0.238 0.135
Long Term Debt / Assets 0.092 0.082 0.099 0.087 0.096 0.087 0.100 0.057
III. Operating Characteristics
Return on Assets 0.171 0.114 0.148 0.138 0.151 0.138 0.143 0.149
Return on Equity 0.585 0.474 0.400 0.324 0.355 0.332 0.388 0.324
Investment Rate 0.160 0.104 0.110 0.209 b 0.160 0.156 0.128 0.178
IV. Characteristics of the IPO
Gross Proceeds / Total Assets 0.243 -- 0.147 0.263 a 0.255 0.197 0.171 0.353 a
Net Proceeds / Total Assets 0.102 -- 0.000 0.162 a 0.057 0.145 b 0.004 0.196 a
Net Proceeds / Gross Proceeds 0.531 -- 0.000 0.682 a 0.261 0.996 a 0.024 0.627
Notes:
(a, b) means significant two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test of difference of medians at 0.01; 0.05 level.
1) Firms that went public between 1977 and 1997 as of the year of the Initial Public Offering.
2) Full sample of firms in the CERIS dataset, excluding observations for the firms that went public between 1977 and 1997 and of firms already quoted in the Milan Stock Exchange.
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Table 3
Italian Newly Public Firms. Pre and Post-IPO Size, Growth, Profitability, and Leverage
(median values of two-year averages before and after the IPO)
IPO
Sample
Group Affiliated
IPOs
Independent
 IPOs
IPO 80
(1977-1989)
IPO 90
 (1991-1999)
N. Firms 36 16 20 24 12
pre-IPO post-IPO pre-IPO post-IPO pre-IPO post-IPO pre-IPO post-IPO pre-IPO post-IPO
Employees 592 638 b 910 958 417 483 a 741 793 365 370 b
Employment Growth 0.002 0.011 -0.008 -0.007 0.008 0.015 -0.008 0.006 0.012 0.022
Investment Rate 0.109 0.110 0.103 0.099 0.137 0.135 0.104 0.110 0.126 0.118
Real Sales Growth 0.060 0.036 0.063 0.058 0.059 0.008 0.061 0.078 0.060 0.006
ROA 0.201 0.144 a 0.192 0.150 0.216 0.139 a 0.204 0.154 b 0.181 0.112 a
Leverage 0.498 0.364 b 0.507 0.425 0.498 0.334 b 0.506 0.417 0.498 0.318 a
Note:  (a, b) means significant sign-rank (Wilcoxon) test of difference of medians at 0.01; 0.05 level.
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Table 4: Analysis of the Ex-Post Behaviour of Firms going Public
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Year
0
Year
+ 1
Year
+ 2
Year
+ 3 Adj-R
2
Investment Rate IPO-80s 0.016 -0.018 -0.026 -0.016 0.101
(0.658) (-0.794) (-1.036) (-0.511)
IPO-90s 0.052** 0.004 -0.004 -0.027
(2.569) (0.253) (-0.213) (-0.896)
IPO-Large 0.013 -0.022 -0.044* -0.046 0.101
(0.583) (-0.961) (-1.718) (-1.420)
IPO-Small 0.079***b 0.018 0.044**a 0.060 b
(3.973) (0.914) (1.961) (1.424)
IPO-AFF -0.031 -0.028 -0.056 -0.070 0.101
(-0.922) (-0.884) (-1.471) (-1.537)
IPO-IND 0.073***a 0.008 0.015 c 0.037 b
(4.587) (0.527) (0.972) (1.408)
Growth rate of IPO-80s 0.096*** 0.031 0.050 -0.029 0.063
Total Assets (3.710) (0.839) (1.635) (-1.174)
IPO-90s 0.205***c -0.049 -0.016 0.005
(3.577) (-1.363) (-0.478) (0.116)
IPO-Large 0.114*** 0.014 0.031 -0.021 0.063
(3.843) (0.382) (1.039) (-0.786)
IPO-Small 0.202*** -0.003 0.047 -0.012
(3.529) (-0.077) (1.072) (-0.310)
IPO-AFF 0.073** 0.021 -0.017 -0.023 0.063
(2.190) (0.433) (-0.451) (-0.672)
IPO-IND 0.180***b 0.003 0.077***c -0.011
(4.777) (0.087) (2.462) (-0.366)
Growth rate of IPO-80s -0.005 0.024 -0.003 -0.010 0.070
Sales (-0.243) (1.092) (-0.122) (-0.446)
IPO-90s -0.041 -0.095**b -0.087***a -0.016
(-1.149) (-2.357) (-3.327) (-0.430)
IPO-Large -0.005 -0.018 -0.051** 0.006 0.070
(-0.239) (-0.768) (-2.272) (0.255)
IPO-Small -0.045* 0.018 0.058**a -0.045
(-1.724) (0.445) (2.067) (-1.363)
IPO-AFF -0.019 -0.018 -0.026 -0.013 0.069
(-0.780) (-0.505) (-0.917) (-0.433)
IPO-IND -0.011 0.002 -0.017 -0.002
(-0.451) (0.101) (-0.650) (-0.062)
Growth rate of IPO-80s 0.012 0.021* -0.000 0.007 0.206
Employment (0.754) (1.852) (-0.021) (1.072)
IPO-90s 0.046 0.010 -0.003 0.068
(1.102) (0.437) (-0.103) (0.901)
IPO-Large 0.010 0.003 -0.015 0.014 0.206
(0.687) (0.259) (-1.176) (0.855)
IPO-Small 0.072 0.051**c 0.033 b 0.024
(1.251) (2.226) (1.564) (1.248)
IPO-AFF -0.004 0.005 -0.024* -0.000 0.206
(-0.370) (0.356) (-1.802) (-0.045)
IPO-IND 0.045 c 0.027* 0.018 b 0.034*
(1.565) (1.722) (1.120) (1.679)
Continued: Analysis of the Ex-Post Behaviour of Firms going Public
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Year
0
Year
+ 1
Year
+ 2
Year
+ 3 Adj-R
2
Leverage (Debt / IPO-80s -0.017 -0.004 0.007 -0.000 0.612
Debt + Equity) (-0.669) (-0.166) (0.249) (-0.012)
IPO-90s -0.196***a -0.214***a -0.189***a -0.178***a
(-5.397) (-8.062) (-5.725) (-3.751)
IPO-Large -0.070*** -0.058** -0.058* -0.045 0.612
(-2.596) (-2.151) (-1.829) (-1.487)
IPO-Small -0.079** -0.038 0.024 c 0.050 b
(-1.961) (-1.121) (0.720) (1.445)
IPO-AFF -0.031 -0.017 -0.007 -0.005 0.612
(-0.965) (-0.482) (-0.177) (-0.131)
IPO-IND -0.106*** -0.086*** -0.058** -0.037
(-3.492) (-3.011) (-1.970) (-1.094)
Long Term Debt / IPO-80s 0.006 0.019 0.056*** 0.038** 0.574
Assets (0.407) (1.274) (3.002) (2.378)
IPO-90s -0.018 -0.034***a -0.023*a -0.011
(-1.043) (-3.395) (-1.880) (-0.364)
IPO-Large -0.005 0.003 0.032* 0.018 0.574
(-0.398) (0.210) (1.836) (1.141)
IPO-Small 0.010 0.021 0.058** 0.077***b
(0.364) (0.873) (2.137) (2.996)
IPO-AFF 0.012 0.019 0.066** 0.038* 0.574
(0.599) (1.002) (2.475) (1.869)
IPO-IND -0.012 -0.004 0.017 0.027
(-0.908) (-0.287) (1.024) (1.351)
Return on Assets IPO-80s 0.032*** 0.026*** 0.022** -0.005 0.609
(2.904) (2.720) (2.541) (-0.532)
IPO-90s 0.016 -0.023*a -0.028**a -0.006
(1.189) (-1.748) (-2.404) (-0.327)
IPO-Large 0.025** 0.011 0.004 -0.005 0.609
(2.530) (1.267) (0.596) (-0.523)
IPO-Small 0.040** 0.020 0.028 0.001
(2.070) (1.188) (1.551) (0.083)
IPO-AFF 0.024** 0.011 0.004 -0.001 0.609
(1.954) (0.958) (0.490) -0.057)
IPO-IND 0.031*** 0.016 0.016 -0.005
(2.548) (1.406) (1.386) (-0.475)
Return on Sales IPO-80s 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.019*** 0.670
(3.951) (4.149) (4.449) (2.549)
IPO-90s 0.017** 0.009 b -0.001 a 0.006
(2.203) (1.050) (-0.116) (0.478)
IPO-Large 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.011 0.670
(2.918) (2.893) (2.566) (1.579)
IPO-Small 0.056***b 0.052***b 0.056***a 0.041***c
(4.042) (4.044) (4.143) (2.599)
IPO-AFF 0.025** 0.022** 0.022** 0.024** 0.670
(2.459) (2.232) (2.108) (2.335)
IPO-IND 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.015*
(3.894) (3.922) (3.796) (1.680)
Notes: t-statistics in round brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*** Coefficient significantly from 0 at the 1 percent level or less.
**   Coefficient significantly from 0 at the 5 percent level.
* Coefficient significantly from 0 at the 10 percent.
a, b, c, denote significance of differences between coefficients of sub-samples, at the 1%, 5% and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 5: Analysis of the Ex-Ante Behaviour of Firms going Public
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Year
- 3
Year
- 2
Year
- 1
Year
0 Adj-R
2
Investment Rate IPO-80s 0.116 0.013 -0.004 0.033* 0.101
(0.959) (0.604) (-0.107) (1.757)
IPO-90s -0.023 0.021 0.084** 0.069***
-(1.045) (0.790) (1.827) (3.658)
IPO-Large 0.082 0.021 0.041 0.037** 0.100
(0.883) (1.073) (1.162) (2.193)
IPO-Small -0.028 -0.027 -0.026 0.058***
(-0.754) (-1.121) (-1.019) (2.997)
IPO-AFF 0.171 0.005 -0.026 -0.006 0.101
(1.070) (0.209) (-0.830) (-0.284)
IPO-IND -0.032* 0.018 0.070*c 0.078***a
(1.611) (0.790) (1.637) (5.156)
Growth rate of IPO-80s -0.041 -0.013 -0.004 0.086*** 0.063
Total Assets (-1.207) (-0.437) (-0.169) (3.262)
IPO-90s -0.005 0.037 0.101***a 0.242***a
(-0.151) (1.230) (2.757) (4.287)
IPO-Large -0.041 -0.001 0.020 0.111*** 0.063
(-1.509) (-0.022) (0.882) (3.795)
IPO-Small 0.010 -0.022 0.052 0.204***
(0.153) (-0.535) (1.420) (3.606)
IPO-AFF -0.015 -0.000 -0.009 0.072** 0.063
(-0.400) (-0.007) (-0.356) (2.097)
IPO-IND -0.050 -0.008 0.051**c 0.176***b
(-1.539) (-0.229) (2.119) (4.796)
Growth rate of IPO-80s -0.026 -0.026 0.012 -0.008 0.067
Sales (-0.814) (-0.897) (0.654) (-0.423)
IPO-90s 0.052 c 0.125***a 0.102***b 0.022
(1.581) (3.588) (2.644) (0.599)
IPO-Large -0.004 0.037 0.043** 0.011 0.066
(-0.140) (1.467) (2.095) (0.528)
IPO-Small 0.013 -0.049 0.022 -0.057**b
(0.180) (-0.819) (0.585) (-2.099)
IPO-AFF -0.003 -0.031 0.036 -0.010 0.066
(-0.087) (-1.041) (1.361) (-0.416)
IPO-IND 0.001 0.079**a 0.044* 0.002
(0.025) (2.307) (1.750) (0.093)
Growth rate of IPO-80s -0.000 -0.016 0.017 0.010 0.206
Employment (-0.011) (-1.438) (1.443) (0.646)
IPO-90s 0.050 0.073**a 0.080**c 0.077*
(1.468) (2.080) (2.282) (1.827)
IPO-Large 0.011 0.008 0.029** 0.016 0.205
(0.745) (0.509) (2.083) (1.038)
IPO-Small 0.031 0.028 0.057 0.070
(0.841) (0.976) (1.332) (1.313)
IPO-AFF -0.004 -0.001 0.032* 0.003 0.205
(-0.262) (-0.133) (1.613) (0.256)
IPO-IND 0.033 0.025 0.038* 0.048*
(1.331) (0.921) (1.745) (1.668)
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Continued: Analysis of the Ex-Ante Behaviour of Firms going Public
Year
- 3
Year
– 2
Year
- 1
Year
0 Adj-R
2
Leverage (Debt / IPO-80s 0.049 0.023 0.028 -0.010 0.613
Debt + Equity) (1.497) (0.968) (1.192) (-0.408)
IPO-90s -0.018 -0.049*c -0.033 -0.175***a
(-0.536) (-1.639) (-1.068) (-4.344)
IPO-Large 0.044 0.020 0.032 -0.046* 0.612
(1.532) (0.959) (1.545) (-1.724)
IPO-Small -0.023 c -0.049 c -0.044 c -0.093**
(-1.027) (-1.415) (-1.140) (-2.320)
IPO-AFF 0.045 0.029 0.026 -0.020 0.612
(1.133) (1.024) (0.890) (-0.625)
IPO-IND 0.019 -0.014 0.006 -0.086***
(0.682) (-0.584) (0.228) (-2.835)
Return on Assets IPO-80s 0.017 0.025** 0.049*** 0.037*** 0.613
(1.280) (2.062) (4.151) (3.370)
IPO-90s -0.006 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.033**
(-0.457) (2.620) (3.280) (2.247)
IPO-Large -0.004 0.023** 0.035*** 0.030*** 0.613
(-0.418) (2.094) (3.887) (3.128)
IPO-Small 0.084***a 0.078***a 0.092***a 0.056***
(2.724) (4.719) (4.970) (3.083)
IPO-AFF 0.018 0.020 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.613
(1.206) (1.451) (2.521) (2.547)
IPO-IND 0.001 0.044*** 0.063***b 0.039***
(0.100) (3.139) (5.039) (3.221)
Notes:
t-statistics in round brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*** Coefficient significantly from 0 at the 1 percent level or less.
**   Coefficient significantly from 0 at the 5 percent level.
* Coefficient significantly from 0 at the 10 percent.
a, b, c, denote significance of differences between coefficients of sub-samples, at the 1%, 5% and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Appendix A
Table A1 – Standardized difference in medians for US firms
t-1 t+0 t+1 t+2 t+3
1. Growth rate of Total Assets 0.239 0.639 0.049 0.041 0.010
2. Growth rate of Fixed Capital 0.171 0.314 0.231 0.081 0.019
3. Growth rate of Sales 0.169 0.200 0.149 0.095 0.053
4. Growth rate of Employment 0.098 0.163 0.125 0.068 0.029
Table A2 – Large US Firms going Public 1981-1997
(Median of employment @ IPO gt. than 500)
t-1 t+0 t+1 t+2 t+3
1. Growth rate of Total Assets 0.095888 0.255 0.132 0.106 0.085
2. Growth rate of Fixed Capital 0.061759 0.162 0.170 0.112 0.078
3. Growth rate of Sales 0.14898 0.169 0.129 0.098 0.084
4. Number of employees 1.134 1.27 1.438 1.623 1.738
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